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Decision Making MethoD in eMergency 
Introduction: In case of emergency we can face a special situation without any warning sign 
and we can meet the requirements for improvisation making our decision. Improvisation can 
be  at any level of the management (strategic, operational and tactical) but at tactical level the 
time pressur is certainly the biggest problem. Fire managers have a typical profession, during 
which making recognition-primed decisions as a symbol of naturalistic decision-making is reg-
ularly required. Method: Different tools and methods were used to achieve goals; one of them 
was the study of the relevant literature, the other one was author’s own experience as a firefight-
ing manager. Other results come from two surveys: one of them was an essay analysis, the sec-
ond one was a word association test; both of theme were specially created for this research by 
the author. Results: the author created a simple and a complex model for firefighting managers 
making decisions, taking into account the time pressure, the limited capability of processing in-
formation and also a mechanism complementing the recognition-primed decision. 
1. IntroductIon 
disaster managers, especially firefighters, can face a special or emergency situation with-
out any warning sign and even if it was forecast they can meet the requirements of improv-
isation making their decision. It can be a nuclear accident or its generated problem not just 
in Hungary but also at international level1, a chemical accident in the industry or at differ-
ent transportation lines like road or train . Improvisation can be taken at any level of the 
management (strategic, operational and tactical) but at tactical level the time pressure is 
certainly the biggest problem. This article focuses on fire managers as an ideal example to 
1 Pátzay, Gy., Weiser L., Feil F., Patek G.: Analysis and Selective treatment of radioactive Waste Waters and 
Sludges in Waste Water, In: Fernando Sabastian Garcia Fernando Sabastian Garcia (ed.) Waste Water- Evalua-
tion and Management. rijeka: Intech Education and Publishing, 2011. pp. 203-216
demonstrate a special decision making method in emergency and shows a modellisation of 
the method for better understanding. Even if regulations for prevention are very important 
and following its rules can help a lot in many cases e.g. in chemical industry or chemical 
transportation,2 preparing the responsible organizations for new challenges are not avoid-
able. new challenges mean naturally many topics like regulations3, work of authority, aca-
demic or special trainings4 , activity of voluntary organizations and there are also other is-
sues like climate change or GIS-based decision support systems at tactical level5. Military 
practice can be also adopted in some cases  –, but can also raise the problem at a large scale 
incident or at the method of recovery6 or  cross border cooperation7. From the wide range 
of the problems mentioned above this article focuses on the operational and tactical level of 
the active intervention where problems converge to one main problem, which is the quick 
decision, quick response.   
An important element of the activities of security managers or emergency responders is 
that they cannot, or only to a very limited extent can modify the terms of the task, improve 
them as desired. despite the differences of environment, indications of the complexity of the 
situation, the possibility of the radical change in the given situation, uncertainty and ambi-
guity of the information available can be recognized and well identified. Most of these fac-
tors are present; occasionally all of them may be present at a certain level of emergency deci-
sions: including the strategic, operational and tactical levels, but certainly with a different fo-
cus or at different times. on strategic and operational levels, in general, not only more time 
is available, but also human and technical resources are at hand more broadly, and decision 
support instruments as well to reduce uncertainties occurring. All of them stand implicit at 
the background of the intervention’s safety, which is a priority during the intervention and 
also a very important and complex question at tactical level8. 
As an example, the extinction of fire in a minor dwelling house requires the implementa-
tion of a completely different, simpler scope of tasks than to control fire in a mid-high build-
2 Horváth, H., Kátai-urban L.: Veszély-elhárítási tervezés a vasúti rendező-pályaudvarokon; Katasztrófavédelmi 
szemle: Védelem 2013. XX. (2) www.vedelem.hu/letoltes/tanulmany/tan436.pdf downloaded: 13.03.2014
3 Endrődi, I.: A katasztrófavédelem feladat-, és szervezet rendszere, national university of Public Service, Buda-
pest, Vezető- és továbbképzési Intézet, p. 86 2013 
4 Grósz, Z.: Védelmi igazgatási képzés a Zrínyi Miklós nemzetvédelmi Egyetemen, VÉdELEM – KAtASZtrÓ-
FA- tŰZ- ÉS PoLGÁrI VÉdELMI SZEMLE 3: (5) pp. 23-27. ISSn 1218-2958
5 Kóródi, Gy.: A térinformatika új lehetőségei a háborússérült-ellátásban; KArd ÉS toLL 2002:(1) pp. 139-
141.
6 Ambrusz, J.: A vis maior tartalék felhasználás szabályai, valamint a lakossági kárenyhítés lehetősége, az ed-
digi országos és helyi tapasztalatok tükrében; Védelem on-line http://vedelem.hu/?pageid=kereses_index , 
downloaded 26.02.2014, ISSn 1218-2958
7 Komjáthy, L.: MAGYArorSZÁG tŰZVÉdELME A HAtÁrMEntI tELEPÜLÉSEK tŰZVÉdELME, HAd-
MÉrnÖK 8: (1) pp. 99-106. 2013 http://hadmernok.hu/2013_1_komjathyl.pdf  downloaded: 28.03.2014, ISSn 
1788-1919
8 Pántya, P.: Hatékonyság és biztonság növelése az osztó vonala mögött, VÉdELEM onLInE: tŰZ- ÉS KA-
tASZtrÓFAVÉdELMI SZAKKÖnYVtÁr 2011 pp. 1-8. ISSn 1218-2958
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ing9 10 or ensuring the preventive rules11. Short term disasters require immediate reaction, 
however slowly developed climate change gives time to create a strategy12. 
The different scopes of tasks exist in different environments and structures, so the solu-
tion of similar basic problems also exists in other dimensions. Based on the author’s own ex-
perience, the more extensive case we are dealing with in time, space and from the aspect of 
involvement in the incident, the more cumulatively the above factors prevail, but because of 
the protracted implementation, it is easier to solve them. The most limiting factor from the 
ones above is time. This provides a framework impossible to burst and a forced drift, a pres-
surized channel for the decision-maker, entangled in which one can no longer break free. 
The functional background of decisions made in a short time, their mechanism different 
from the conventional has been studied recently, and the name recognition-primed decision13 
has been given to this special decision procedure. 
2. dEcISIon-MAKInG MEcHAnISM oF A FIrE MAnAGEr
Limited time frame allows the processing and management of limited amount of information. 
We know from Miller’s research that the short-term memory of the vast majority of people can 
only process simultaneously 7±2 units of information14. This information, of course, can be 
quite different, e.g. characteristics of fire, the capacity of the response unit, a number, or even 
the absence of information searched for. our memory handles the combinations, “operations” 
between the information units as information units15, from which clearly springs forth that the 
capacity of the short-term memory of a firefighting manager is exhausted very quickly. 
The author has proven by essay analysis16  how complex the tasks of emergency respond-
ers are; this shows that in several cases, simultaneously, there is or would be a need to proc-
ess many more units of information than the capacity of our short-term memory would al-
low. The maintenance of our decision-making capability, i.e. our short-term memory, based 
on the above, clearly requires that we should omit analysing and evaluating decision-mak-
ing processes protracted and use the recognition-primed decision-making procedure, based 
on previous experience.
9 Bleszity, J. and Zelenák, M.: tűzvédelmi ismeretek, Budapest: Szövetkezeti Szervezési Iroda, 272 p. 1990
10 Pántya, P.: A tűzoltói biztonság növelése zárt téri beavatkozások során, Műszaki tudomány az Észak Alföldi 
régióban 2012. debrecen: debreceni Akadémiai Bizottság Műszaki Szakbizottsága, 2012. pp. 393-404.
11 Horváth, L. A MŰEMLÉK ÉPÜLEtEK tŰZVÉdELMI KÉrdÉSEI, 2013. XXII. (3). tematikus Különszám 
tŰZVÉdELEM 2013, pp. 109-114. http://uni-nke.hu/downloads/bsz/bszemle2013/3/9.pdf downloaded: 
31.03.2014.
12 Padányi, J.: Éghajlatváltozás és a biztonság összefüggései., HAdtudoMÁnY 1-2: pp. 33-46. 2009, http://
mhtt.eu/hadtudomany/2009/1_2/033-046.pdf downloaded: 16.03.2014; ISSn 1788-1919
13 Klein, G. A.: Strategies of decision making, Military rewiev, no.5. 1989
14 Miller, G. A.: The Magic number 7 Plus or Minus 2; Some Limits on our capacity for Processing Information, 
Psychology review, Vol. 63. 1956
15 ribárszki, I.: döntéspszichológia, Zrínyi Miklós nemzetvédelmi Egyetem, Jegyzet, Budapest, 1999
16 restas, A.: Principles of decision-Making of Firefighting Managers, Based on Essay Analysis, In: Hervé 
chaudet Liliane Pellegrin, nathalie Bonnardel (Ed.) Proceedings of the 11th International conference on 
naturalistic decision Making, Marseille, France, 2013. pp. 247-250, ISBn:979 – 10 – 92329 – 00 – 1
The author wishes to create a model element to demonstrate the decision-making mech-
anism of firefighting managers, which takes into account the limits of the simultaneous 
processing of information, that is, it also illustrates Miller’s decision-making capacity. Since 
the information units may be qualitatively independent of each other, the author chooses 
the simplest graphical representation of the unit-based discrete difference to separate them 
from each other. A model element must be able to graphically demonstrate the schemes 
based on earlier experience, the characteristics of different fires, and the interlocking of the 
former as the application of the scheme, which represents the technically correct solution 
of the task, i.e. the effective decision. The model refers, at the general model of recognition-
primed decisions, mostly to Klein’s work17 18.
Figure 1. • Graphic representation of the empiric scheme of recognition-primed decisions 
matching a given situation. 
SourcE:  AutHor
The schemes in figure 1 represent 7 graphical discrete values, which are marked by positive 
or negative protrusions and their “centre line”; these values indicate the amount of simulta-
neous decision-making capacity. Therefore, the “negatives” of the schemes can be matched 
with a given situation and the necessary solution. As an integration of the above process-
es, decision mechanism functions as follows: an experienced firefighter has performed the 
elimination of a large number of different fires. despite the differing parameters of each fire, 
some characterizing features can be well conceived (figure 2). 
The characterizing features of identical types of fires are crystallized by experience and are 
fixed in our long-term memory. Similarly, to the characteristics of a fire, the characteristics 
of successful extinguishing, the facilitating decisions are also fixed (figure 3); just as the mis-
takes desired to be avoided and the unsuccessful procedures and failures. Experience gained 
through many years, based on the features of fires, formulate the system of schemes, behind 
which we can find actions (decisions) efficiently applicable to eliminate them. 
17 Klein, G. A.: Strategies of decision making, Military review, no.5. 1989
18 Klein, G. A.: Sources of Power: How People Make decisions cambridge, MA: MIt Press 1999 ISBn 
0262611465
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If another incident has almost the same circumstances as one already many times suc-
cessfully eliminated by an emergency manager previously (model of positive confirma-
tion), he will attempt to use the same techniques in the procedures. Therefore, another 
fire, quasi bearing the typified properties of previous similar fires, makes a decision-mak-
er involuntarily immediately recall the typified decisions. The properties of a fire and of 
previous successful extinguishing operations, based on the above, are closely interlinked; 
they are each other’s “reflections” (figures 4). Through the results of association studies the 
author proved that the above, i.e. the characteristics of a fire and the thoughts directed to-
wards its extinguishing, the schemes of response, are very closely connected in a complex 
way in the case of firefighters. 
Figure 2. • Evolvement of the scheme on fire. 
SourcE:  AutHor
When a firefighting manager identifies a fire, he imagines what would happen if he applied 
the usual tactics to fight it. If the scheme of solution matches, he accepts it, if not, he rejects 
it and thinks of the next most typical action. Thus, it is a recognition-primed, model-match-
ing process, which can be followed by a quick and almost automatic decision.
The long-term memory of a firefighting manager, through practical experience, has the 
schemes of both different fires and their extinguishing characteristics. during another 
alert, information available and collected on a fire automatically generates the recollection 
of the scheme necessary to solve it, based on which a firefighting manager defines the nec-
essary firefighting tactics. However, the results of association studies clearly point in the 
direction that at a given fire (problem) managers do not focus on the fire as a problem but 
rather on its immediate solution. From this, the author makes the conclusion that a deci-
sion-maker will not follow the change of the characteristics of a fire, but the validity of so-
lution scheme, that is, the dynamics of the implementation of the extinguishing process. 
This does not mean a contradiction with the previous, but rather a difference in views, the 
shift of emphasis of the focus of attention. 
The difference in views, that is, the shift of emphasis means that a firefighting manager does 
not focus on the change of characteristics of a fire, but rather on the expected evolvement and 
dynamics of the scheme selected, i.e. extinguishing tactics. Based on the previous, these are, of 
course, inseparable from each other, however, the author finds the dominance of the interven-
tions trend so strong in the results of association studies in the case of firefighters that, based 
on it, the author judges his above conclusion to be justified. The thought sequence fire–charac-
teristics–solution is attractively logical, however, the decision capacity of our memory is facil-
itated if it manages and reduces the necessary information in the simplest possible way. Since 
the schemes of characteristics relating to a fire exist together with the schemes of solution, 
there is no real need for it to appear in our short-term memory. Thus, the function appearing 
is modified to the simplest and shows the format fire–solution. 
Figure 3. • Evolvement of the scheme on the lessons learnt from extinguishing a fire. 
SourcE:  AutHor
The above do not contradict Klein’s model, they rather complement it. Klein, in his mod-
el, evaluates (imagines what will happen) the results of matching schemes by the decision-
maker prior to performing the action version which, based on the author’s own experience, 
is so without doubt, however, the aftermath of the decision, in the author’s opinion, is much 
more significant in the case of firefighting managers. 
Figure 4. • Aggregated schemes on fire and the evolvement of the lessons learnt from extin-
guishing it. 
SourcE:  AutHor
Since the problem immediately and automatically generates both the direction of the 
solution and the start of the action version, it is rather the process itself which is impor-
tant in terms of efficiency, which is caused by the decision. the schemes based on expe-
rience certainly contain the information on the dynamics of the process of fire, so if it 
meets the expectations, we do not have to modify the original firefighting tactics. How-
ever, if the dynamics of the process does not suit the expectations, the change is inevi-
table in the performance of efficiency. Based on the above, the recognition-primed de-
cision is not just an individual act before extinguishing the fire, but it is also the con-
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tinuous accompaniment as needed. therefore, the author shares the view that an expe-
rienced decision-maker perceives the problem together with its solution; furthermore, 
the author extends the continuous co-existence of the problem and of the whole proc-
ess of solution of an emergency. 
3. MEcHAnISMS coMPLEMEntInG A rEcoGnItIon-PrIMEd dEcISIon
different triggers, internal resources ensure the operation of recognition-primed decisions. 
Klein in his work assumes 5 markedly distinct abilities, these are intuition, imagination, per-
ception of the invisible, the ability to formulate, metaphors and analogies19. In the joint work 
of cohen, Freeman and Thomson20, the attention is drawn to the importance and benefits of 
critical thinking as criticism of actions planned by ourselves. 
despite the fact that one could assume, based on the previous issues, that recognition-
primed decision-making is exclusivity on a tactical level, it is absolutely not true. We can 
compare it with several fires or incidents, still, one of the essential features is that it protracts 
in time. It allows the decision-maker to think over the situation, collect information, devel-
op action versions and consider them.  
3.1. Analytical thinking
Killion sees the combination of recognition-primed decision-making with the analyzing 
and evaluating procedure in two ways21. In both cases, the conditions are that adequate time 
should be available for analyzing the options. In the first case, prior to recognition-primed 
decisions, focusing on the given circumstances, we set up options and analyze them.  In the 
second case, a more detailed analysis of the action version of our recognition-primed deci-
sion may take place.  In the latter case, the spectrum of the task is obviously significantly nar-
rower than in the first case. The two mechanisms, depending on the situation, can be harmo-
nized or one of them may become predominant. 
3.2. Critical thinking on a tactical level
cohen, Freeman and Wolf studied the possible decision support role of critical thinking on a 
tactical decision-making level22. In their work, active naval officers and case reports were stud-
19 Klein, G. A.: Sources of Power: How People Make decisions cambridge, MA: MIt Press 1999 ISBn 
0262611465
20 cohen, S. M., Freeman, J.t., Thompson, B.B.: Integrated critical Thinking training and decision Support for 
tactical Anti-Air Warfare; report, cognitive technologies, Inc., naval Air Warfare center training System 
division, contract no. n61339-96-r-0046. 1996
21 Killion,t.H.: decision Making and the Levels of War; Military review, united States Army combined Arms 
center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, november-december 2000
22 cohen, S. M., Freeman, J.t., Thompson, B.B.: Integrated critical Thinking training and decision Support for 
tactical Anti-Air Warfare; report, cognitive technologies, Inc., naval Air Warfare center training System 
division, contract no. n61339-96-r-0046. 1996
ied based on which they state that experienced emergency decision-makers, in new situations, 
using their previous experience, make decisions with the help of recognition-primed mecha-
nisms. cohen’s model explains in detail the critical analytical strategies that contribute to the 
operation of recognition-primed thinking. Systematic situation models often based on infor-
mal narratives as schemes organize our information in cause and effect relationship in individ-
ual cases and underpin the development of recognition-primed thinking. 
3.3. Satisfactory procedure mechanism
Previously we have seen that a firefighting manager’s time, just as the time of other deci-
sion-makers in an emergency to make a decision is limited. Since this time limit precludes 
the possibility to carry out the necessary analyses of the classic model, objectively the choice 
of an optimum option is not achievable for a decision-maker. In response to the difficulties 
of the collection of information and the reduction of the costs in relation, a decision-mak-
er does not strive for optimum results, but, depending on the circumstances, settles for sat-
isfactory solutions. 
3.4. Decisions by exceptions
The aim of the application of the method is that the leadership responsibilities of managers 
should be drastically reducible; its essence is that we should only intervene into processes 
having permanent characteristics in majority, if they cross the pre-specified lower and up-
per limits. The method, management by sensitive exception, so derived from the dynamics 
of the processes, the necessary interventions are now possible even before crossing the bor-
ders23. The method of management by exceptions, based on the author’s experience, is the 
greatest help for a firefighting manager to continuously maintain his decision capacity. It can 
appear in different ways, like protocol procedures, individual way of speaking, silence ap-
proval, peripheral vision, and information-processing in zones. 
3.5. Creativity 
creativity has many definitions. Munteanu, in one of his works, presents 35 ones, which ap-
proach creativity in different ways, however, there is no single definition generally accept-
ed or used,24. Analyses researching creativity show that there are three general directions 
of study25 26. The first one concerns the nature of creative thinking, the second one the de-
velopment of creativity and the third one the characterizing properties of creative people. 
23 Hoványi, G.: A menedzsment új horizontjai; Közgazdasági Szemle, XLIX. (3)., pp 251-264, 2002
24 Munteanu, A.: Incursiune în creatologie. timişoara, Editura Augusta. 1994
25 csíkszentmihályi,M.:  Kreativitás – A flow és a felfedezés, avagy a találékonyság pszichológiája; Akadémiai Ki-
adó, 2008
26 Zoltayné Paprika, Z. döntéselmélet; Alinea Kiadó, Budapest, 2002, ISBn 9638630612 
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Amongst the properties, there is practically none, which would not be advantageous for ef-
ficient work in a VucA environment describing the working conditions of a firefighting 
manager. Based on the above, the author made the conclusion that the creative capabilities 
of a firefighting manager can be explicitly beneficial for facilitating the technically correct 
decisions relating to firefighting and technical rescue tasks. 
3.6. Heuristics
Heuristics means that certain distortions are not incidental and unarranged errors, but the 
results of simplifying mechanisms, with which decision-makers make the complicated tasks 
manageable for themselves, which cut the Gordian knot27. Based on research related to the 
names tversky and Kahneman, we distinguish 5 basic groups of heuristics28. These are rep-
resentativeness, availability, fixing (imprint) and adjustment heuristics, retrospective distor-
tion, as well as overconfidence and calibration. Studying the activities of firefighting manag-
ers, there are many examples of practical heuristics. 
research show that overconfidence means that the division between actual and putative 
knowledge is around 50% 29. We are best able to judge the certainty of our decisions around 
80% of knowledge, over this value we underestimate our abilities. The above have shown that 
our actual knowledge does not grow parallel with certainty; the increase of our knowledge 
does not automatically mean the growth of self-assurance30. during firefighting (technical 
rescue), the characteristic VucA environment exactly expresses that the actual knowledge 
of a decision-maker  can only be partial, he can only be sure temporarily of the reliability of 
his knowledge. Aggregating the above, we can see that the risk of overconfidence continu-
ously prevails in the decisions of a firefighting manager. 
4. tHE coMPLEX ModEL oF dEcISIon-MAKInG In EMErGEncY
If not enough time is available for analysing and evaluating decision-making, recognition-
primed procedures receive a greater role. critical thinking uses recognition procedures, 
during which the decision-making process can be accelerated or analysed with the help of 
a quick test and depending on the time available. The quick test, considering the circum-
stances, hinders recognition-primed decision and prefers critical thinking. However, when 
the circumstances are inappropriate for critical analysing thinking, the quick test allows an 
immediate reply. 
despite the limited decision capacity, thanks to recognition-primed mechanisms, in most 
of the occasions correct decisions are made by firefighting managers. time limit precludes 
27 Zoltayné Paprika, Z. döntéselmélet; Alinea Kiadó, Budapest, 2002 ISBn 9638630612 
28 twersky,A. & Kahneman,d.: Judgment under uncertainity: heuristics and biases,; Science, vol. 185, pp. 1124-
1131 (1974)
29 Lichtenstein, S. & Fischhoff, B.: do those who know more also know more about how much they know? or-
ganizational Behaviour and Human Performance, Vol. 20. 159-183., 1977
30 Zoltayné Paprika, Z. döntéselmélet; Alinea Kiadó, Budapest, 2002, ISBn 9638630612 
the possibility for the firefighting manager to carry out analyses necessary for the classic 
model; therefore, the selection of the optimal possibility is objectively not attainable by the 
decision-maker. The decision-maker is not striving to achieve ideal results, as a response to 
the difficulties of collecting information and reducing costs in relation, but depending on 
the circumstances, he is satisfied with its satisfactory solution. 
Figure 5. • Complex model of decision-making of firefighting managers in emergencies. 
SourcE:  AutHor
By reducing the time available for decision-making and for maintaining decision-making 
capacity, a firefighting manager applies the management (decision-making) method based 
on exceptions in numerous situations. Its essence is that several moments of interventions 
proceed protocol-like, thus they need not be controlled all the time; on the other hand, not 
all the phases of the processes require direct management decision. 
during the study of creativity, the author has concluded that there is no feature character-
istic of the working circumstances of firefighting managers that would not be advantageous 
to perform efficient work in a VucA environment. Therefore, it is sure that the creative ca-
pabilities of firefighting managers can be explicitly advantageous to facilitate the profession-
ally correct decisions on firefighting and rescue tasks even if a significant part of the charac-
teristics of innovativeness does not favour the performance of an everyday work free of in-
terventions with respect to firefighting managers. 
Heuristics are not random-like errors or specific distortions facilitating our everyday ac-
tivities. These are the results of simplifying mechanisms, through which decision-makers can 
make difficult tasks manageable for themselves. Besides the benefits of heuristics, the greatest 
challenge for a firefighting manager can mean the inherent erroneous distortions, which surely 
often help, but their uncritical acceptance, in certain cases, can end up in fatal dangers. The de-
clared objective and sense of the decisions of firefighting managers is the efficient implemen-
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katalin Pallai
Design consiDeRations anD Results
of a laRge integRity tRaining pRogRamme
foR civil seRvants in HungaRy
This article presents the design considerations for a training methodology for integrity edu-
cation of civil servants in Hungary. During the design process I went beyond the widely used 
principal agent theory and the positivist approach to corruption prevention. I did it because 
I considered the principal agent concept in itself  inadequate for understanding and prevent-
ing corruption in the given context where certain practices that clash with formal regulation 
and the principles of Western democratic integrity are widely tolerated and are spreading like 
memes. In such organizational contexts, prevalent in post-communist public sector organ-
izations, the normative clash between formal regulation and informal culture can create a 
collective action problem situation. In order to solve the normative clash, besides the positiv-
ist anti-corruption instruments, an argumentative process for norm socialization is also nec-
essary. Thus, my training method is built on a dual perspective: corruption analysis and in-
tegrity development are discussed both from a rational, positivist and a post-positivist, ar-
gumentative perspective. The positivist content is conveyed mainly through cognitive chan-
nels. The training method itself serves as a live model for the participants to grasp the argu-
mentative process of norm and trust building still unfamiliar for most experts and civil serv-
ants in the region. The training workshops already implemented for more than 10,000 civil 
servants were also followed by an effectiveness assessment survey the  results of which are al-
so discussed in the paper.
1. IntroductIon
Integrity management is aimed at the prevention of corruption by strenthening corruption 
resistance of public administration. Integrity means that the public organization operates 
according to democratic principles and effectively uses the powers and resources entrusted 
to it for the implementation of the officially accepted purposes and justified public interest.
Integrity approach to corruption prevention is relatively new in the Hungarian pub-
lic administration. the decisive turn towards the integrity approach happened in the 
tation of emergency interventions. It is symbolized by the principles of firefighting with struc-
tured division, on the top of which we clearly find the saving of human lives. 
Firefighting managers certainly have less time to make their decisions compared to the 
time interval of classic decisions, so their decision mechanism is strongly based on recogni-
tion procedures due to the peculiar environment (VucA), and the limited processing pos-
sibility of simultaneous pieces of information. The competence of firefighters is based on the 
unity of theoretical knowledge and practical experience. Building on practical experience, 
the different mechanisms like analogical thinking, critical analysis, satisfactory procedure, 
decisions based on exceptions, creativity and heuristics, together with the internal triggers, 
hold as pillars and make recognition-primed decision procedure of firefighting managers 
operational. The author illustrates the above as a complex system of emergency decision-
making of firefighting managers in figure 5. 
